ABSTRACT
It took only fifteen years for an army once known for its agility and operational brilliance to turn into a clumsy bureaucratic labyrinth, according to Colonel Emanuel Wald's report to Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Levi. Not surprisingly, Wald's conclusions greatly embarrassed Israeli political and military leaders as news of the report circulated t
TABLE OF CONTENTS
part One|56 pages
The Peace for Galilee War: Anatomy of a Military Failure
part Two|60 pages
The Military Outcome of Previous Wars: Why Were the Lessons not Learned?
part Three|56 pages
The Twilight of Military Power: IDF Force Construction Between the Wars (1973–1982)
part Four|56 pages
The Moloch of “Absolute Security” Catch: Why the Security Establishment and the IDF Are “Drowning Themselves in the Sea”
