ABSTRACT
The Israeli Defense Forces's main military effort in the western sector was to advance two divisions up the coastal axis and encircle Beirut by H-hour + 48. The task in the western sector was a primary Command effort that underpinned the Big Pines operational plan and formed the very basis of the war. Defective planning and management of road traffic were widespread in the sector. Combat in "closed," urban or hilly terrain demands simultaneous movement forward on as many axes as possible in order to exploit fully the power of the forces and increase the chances of a breakthrough. Only one main mission was given to the armored division operating in the central sector during the war: to seize a stronghold on the Beirut Damascus highway at Dahir al-Baydr by H + 48. Lack of military professionalism is the real reason for the discontinuous combat, the absence of night fighting, and the inability to bring supradivisional force to bear.
