ABSTRACT
Has the 2010 constitution managed to cure the crises that informed the struggle for constitutional reform? Specifically, has it transformed governance institutions and practices with a view to expanding socioeconomic opportunities for the Kenyan masses? Importantly, is it able to mediate intra-elite competition, constrain elite misbehaviour, and avert violence? From an analysis of the conduct of politics and political elite behaviour since the enactment of the 2010 constitution, especially in the last two elections, this chapter argues that institutional reforms have facilitated the dispersal of rent-seeking opportunities to a larger political elite through devolution. Moreover, devolution has created opportunities to alter socioeconomic realities for the masses. Additionally, there have been attempts to reform the public bureaucracy to ensure its neutrality in arbitrating elite competition. However, a just and democratic political order remains a distant dream; ethnic identity continues to be the master frame in political mobilisation; and predatory elite behaviour is far from constrained. Under these circumstances, a new wave of contention is currently gathering pace.
