ABSTRACT
Beyond the actors’ preferences, the contours of cross-Strait relations are often shaped by three important factors: first, a long-term incentive structure based on an evolving external Washington-Beijing-Taipei trilateral power balance as well as domestic public opinion in Taiwan; second, the political insecurity of Taiwan, and to a lesser extent, China’s leaders, which in turn shapes their penchant for diversionary cross-Strait policy; and third, both Chinese and Taiwanese society’s ‘asymmetry trust’ in Taiwan’s two main political parties, causing many missed opportunities for cross-Strait engagement. It remains to be seen whether Xi Jinping will become more proactive with regard to cross-Strait unification, or whether he will exhibit greater patience and prefer greater stability in cross-Strait relations. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is facing electoral adversity, will revise its cross-Strait platform in a more Beijing-friendly direction, or whether escalating US-China rivalry will lead to greater expectations of US and Western support and embolden the DPP to hold firm to its Taiwanese nationalist platform.
