ABSTRACT
The Heath government took a defensive approach to the presentation of nuclear policy, starting a decade in which public discussion of nuclear weapons issues was mostly absent. The chapter considers the secrecy surrounding the Heath government’s consideration of Polaris improvement, and its decision in 1973 to pursue “Super Antelope” – the system later codenamed Chevaline. Chevaline would remain an official secret until its disclosure in January 1980, despite preparations for its disclosure before Heath left office in 1974. Few public statements were made by the government on nuclear issues. Its most extensive public engagement was a reluctant response to the 1972–1973 Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee (DEASC) enquiry on nuclear weapons policy. The Heath government’s defensive and reluctant approach – even relative to its Labour predecessors – was largely a product of indecision surrounding Polaris improvement. The chapter also considers the minimal discussion of nuclear issues in public. The response of the International Institute for Strategic Studies to the DEASC enquiry, alongside other papers written by former government official Ian Smart, highlight the way that a nascent strategic studies community challenged the government’s nuclear secrecy. The period also saw a flurry of stories in the press – particularly from investigative journalist Chapman Pincher – speculating on Polaris improvement.
