DOI link for Troubled Partnership
Troubled Partnership book
DOI link for Troubled Partnership
Troubled Partnership book
During World War II. Japanese fighters, such as the famed Zero, were among the most respected and feared combat aircraft in the world. But for decades following the defeat of Japan in 1945, a variety of political and economic factors prevented Japan from developing its own modern national fighter. This changed in the 1980s. Japan began independently developing its first world-class fighter since World War II. After several years of contentious negotiations, the Japanese agreed to work with the United States to cooperatively develop a minimally modified F-16, the FS-X. The new fighter, however, has evolved into a world-class aircraft developed largely by Japanese Industry primarily due to errors committed by the U.S. side. By the fall of 1995, fifty years after the end of World War II, the Zero for the 1990s will have made its first flight, catapulting Japan into the elite ranks of nations capable of developing the most advanced weapon systems. In Troubled Partnership, Mark Lorell traces the evolution of the FS-X, disclosing the conflicting economic and security objectives advanced by U.S. officials, the flawed U.S. policy of technology reciprocity, and the challenges of International collaboration. Its deep Intimacy with the Interplay of policy and economy will make this volume of Intense Interest to political Scientists, military studies specialists, historians, and government officials.
Preface, Figures, Tables, Acknowledgments, Abbreviations, INTRODUCTION, Background, Overview: What Went Wrong?, Organization of This Document, THE U.S. QUEST FOR TECHNOLOGY RECIPROCITY, Introduction, Japan’s Defense Build-Up and the Concept of Burden-Sharing, Developing a Legal Framework for Access to Japanese Defense Technology, Early U.S. Initiatives, New Initiatives from the Reagan Administration, Japanese Resistance—And Eventual Compromise, The Exchange of Notes and the Establishment of the Joint Military Technology Commission, The U.S. Demands for “Free and Automatic Flowback” of Derived Technology, Negotiating the Implementation Arrangements, In Search of a Technology, Of Gallium Arsenide, Integrated Circuits, and Military Radars, The First TAT Visit to Japan, A Brief Glimpse at Japan’s New Military Radar Technologies, Taking a Second Look at Japanese Defense-Related Technologies, Going After the Keiko Surface-to-Air Missile, Pentagon Frustration on the Eve of FS-X, JAPAN’S POSTWAR QUEST FOR A NATIONAL FIGHTER, Introduction, Development of Japan’s Postwar Defense Industry, First Steps, Reviving the Postwar Military Aircraft Industry, Fighters Versus Commercial Aircraft, The Push Toward Indigenous Military Aircraft in the 1970s, Inception of the Rising Sun Fighter, BUILDING THE FIGHTER TECHNOLOGY BASE, Introduction, Learning from Licensed Production, The Unique Nature of the F-15 Program, Military Versus Commercial Spin-Offs from the F-15, Gaining Experience in System Integration, The F-4EJ&aZ Fighter, The XSH-60J Helicopter, The T-4 Jet Trainer, Targeting Development of Key Technologies for the Future Fighter, Advanced Flight-Control Technology, Composite Materials and Aircraft Structures, The MELCO Active Phased-Array Radar, THE BATTLE JOINED: STOPPING THE RISING SUN FIGHTER, Introduction, Background: U.S. Industry Confronts a Shrinking Global Market, The U.S. Government Enters the Fray, Military and Strategic Reasons Behind the Pentagon’s Opposition, Weinberger Rejects High-Pressure Tactics, Japan Stresses Its Advanced Fighter Technologies, The Pentagon Proposes Modification of a U.S. Fighter, Japanese Working-Level Resistance Stiffens, U.S. Contractors’ Initial Modification Proposals, New U.S. Design Proposals Offer Extensive Modification, COLLABORATION IMPOSED, Introduction, Japanese Technology Unveiled, The U.S. Side Regroups: Delaying the Final Japanese Decision, DoD Criticizes Japanese Assumptions on Technology and R&D Costs, Preparing for the Final Showdown: Linking Trade and Security Issues, Updated Design Proposals to Meet Japanese Technology Requirements, The Sullivan Visit: Discounting Japanese Fighter Technology, Trade Frictions and the Toshiba Incident Doom an Indigenous FS-X. 151 Japan Moves to Preserve Technology Objectives on a Collaborative Program, DoD’s New Offensive Against Foreign Fighter Programs, Elimination of the SX-4 Proposal, Transforming the SX-3 to Serve Japan’s Technology Objectives, U.S. Acceptance of Japanese Changes to the SX-3, Japan Agrees to Cooperative Development of the SX-3 Upgrade, THE STRUGGLE OVER PROGRAM CONTROL, A Divided U.S. Government Confronts the Kokusanka Supporters, Initial Discussions on a Program Framework, Early Signs of Technology Flowback as a Central Problem, Forging a Consensus Position on U.S. Negotiating Objectives, Countering the Japanese Proposals, Negotiating a Formal Memorandum of Understanding, The Growing Problem of Technology Flowback, The Conflict Over Derived Versus Indigenous Technology, The Problem of U.S. Participation on Development of the Wing, The Illusion of a Compromise “Working Agreement”, The Japanese Backpedal, The Japanese Yield to U.S. Pressure, THE STORM BREAKS IN CONGRESS, A Political-Military Agreement Attacked on Economic Grounds, Origins of the Attack on the Pentagon’s FS-X Agreement, Production Workshare and the Two-Way Transfer of Technology, Debating the Value of Access to Japanese Technology, The Interagency Battle: Commerce Versus Defense, Victories for the Department of Commerce, Imposing New Conditions on the Japanese, Clarifying U.S. Access to Japanese Technologies, Japanese Frustration, Anger, and Resistance, The Illusion of a Final Settlement, THE SHOWDOWN OVER FS-X AND ITS
AFTERMATH, Introduction, Selling FS-X Technology Benefits to Congress, GAO Questions the Value of Japanese FS-X Technology, Passage of the Byrd Resolution and Conditional Approval of FS-X, Experts Challenge Commercial Value of F-16 Data for Japan, Continuing Congressional Opposition, Growing Japanese Anger, The Campaign to Override the Bush Veto of the Byrd Resolution, Aftermath of the FS-X Dispute: Japan Moves to Transform FS-X, Lingering Suspicions, Japan’s Decision to Develop the Flight-Control Computer Software, The Japanese Move Toward a Unique National Wing Design, Renewal of the Dispute Over U.S. Access to Wing Technology, Japanese Complaints About the Transfer of F-16 Data, Japanese Control over FS-X Design Formally Confirmed, THE RISING SUN FIGHTER REBORN?, Introduction, Controversy Over Cost and Schedule, Reports of Cost Growth and Schedule Slippage, Japan Blames U.S. Government and Contractors for Cost Growth, More Extensive Modifications as a Cause of Cost Growth, The 1989 Debate and the Evolution of the FS-X Design, The Politics of Cost Growth, The Continuing Question of Cost Growth, The Effects of Cost Growth on “Quality Workshare”, Dropping the Maneuvering Canards, Scaling Back Other Work Tasks to Save Costs, Indigenization of FS-X Components and Related Technologies, The Debate over Japanese Licensed Production of U.S. Components, The U.S. Adopts a Hard-Line Position, The Japanese Response: Even More Indigenous Development, THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF R&D: GAINING ACCESS TO JAPANESE FS-X TECHNOLOGIES, Introduction, Transferring the Wing Technology, A Poor Start: The Initial Coupon-Test Failure, Steady Improvement: The Integral Tank Test, GAO Confirms Transfer of the Wing Data, Access to the Four Japanese Avionics Systems, Focus on the MELCO APA Radar, U.S. Radar Specialists Visit Japan, U.S. Concerns Over Technology Transfer, Efforts to Interest U.S. Industry in MELCO Radar Technology, Negotiating to Purchase T/R Modules for Testing in the United States, The FS-X Radar Technology Symposium in Washington, A Purchase Agreement for T/R Modules Is Sealed, Other Nonderived Systems and the JAEI Technology Scandal, The MELCO Mission Computer and Integrated Electronic Warfare System, The JAEI Scandal and Its Effects on the IRS and Flight-Control Computer System, Japan Reacts to U.S. Sanctions, Derived Technology and the Question of Categorization, AN INTERIM TECHNOLOGY BALANCE SHEET, Introduction, Transferring U.S. Technology to Japan, Benefits to U.S. Industry, Revenue and Jobs, Flowback and Access to Japanese Technology, A Technology Transfer Draw?, Military R&D: Long-Term Benefits for Japan, The Enduring Pentagon Goal: Stopping Indigenous Development, Pentagon Goals for Cooperative Development of the FS-X 377 An Extensive Modification Program Approaching Indigenous Development, The FS-X Program Contradicts Many Original Pentagon Objectives, Next Steps, Benefits of Production for the United States, Risks of Cancellation, How to Do Better, RETHINKING COLLABORATION, Introduction, What Went Wrong?, Collaboration Imposed, The Lack of U.S. Influence over the Technological Evolution of the FS-X 400 Japanese Military R&D Capabilities Underestimated, Conflicting U.S. Policy Goals, Misguided Policy on Technology Transfer and Flowback, Gaining Access to Foreign Technologies, Lessons Learned from FS-X, The Case of the X-31 Fighter Technology Demonstrator, Codevelopment Proliferates Military R&D Capabilities, References, Index