ABSTRACT
In Chapter 3, a formal semantics for neutral free logic is proposed that is largely derived from the neutral free semantics proposed by Scott Lehmann (1994, 2001, 2002), but that differs from his semantics in its treatment of the quantifiers. Arguments against Lehmann’s treatment are proposed. Also in Chapter 3, a formal semantics for quantified modal logic is proposed that is based on my neutral free logic. It turns out that many classical logical truths that contain individual constants (such as truth functional tautologies), while they cease to be logical truths on the modal semantics, re-emerge as a posteriori necessary truths under interpretations where the contained constants all refer. Finally it is proposed that logical truth and logical consequence in MNFL should be understood in terms of general validity, as opposed to real-world validity. This proposal is then defended against Zalta’s contentions to the contrary.
