ABSTRACT
In Chapter 4, the approach to reference failure proposed in Chapters Two and Three is defended by considering and criticizing a range of alternative approaches, some of which are proposed by other defenders of DR, while others are proposed by defenders of Meinongian semantics and defenders of substitutional quantification. First, arguments are given against David Braun’s view that atomic sentences containing empty names express false gappy propositions. Second, objections are raised against Nathan Salmon’s view that sincere uses of names whose primary reference conditions are not satisfied would end up referring to abstract mythical beings or objects. Third, Routley’s Meinongian semantics for classical logic is considered. This semantics requires that some individual constants can refer (in the actual world) to nonexistent objects, and such reference is unintelligible: an argument is given that it is not possible to provide any stateable conditions under which reference to nonexistents would be successful. Finally use of substitutional quantification as a possible way of providing an alternative to free logic is considered. Arguments are given which together show that natural languages like English do not in fact contain substitutional quantifiers.
