ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author argues that it is necessary to separate phrase-structural para-syntactic from (real) semantic notions. Simultaneously phrase-structural and semantic approaches start from a universalist perspective, imposing basic ‘universal’ semantic notions on language – and individual languages – even when the semantic data of these languages do not in any clear sense accord with these notions. Rather than incorporating universals into linguistic theory, the logic of the current argument is that universals need to be kept out of linguistic theory. Accordingly, what are essentially extra-linguistic notions of real-world meaning are ‘hardwired’ into the theory, thereby being accorded an abstract generalised status. The same basic criticism applies also to the Hallidayan notions of given and new – as well as Prague-School theme and rheme, and notions such as topic-focus and topic-comment, when these are conceived as both phrase-structural and as semantic.
