ABSTRACT
Our distinction between obligations and ideals was drawn in part in terms of the fact that rules of conduct figure prominently in the former but do not figure prominently or at all in the latter. We argued that reason and choice are part of the practice of political obligation, but we did not take up a major objection to that argument, namely that they are excluded, or that their significance is narrowly limited, by the very fact that rules are prominent in the practice. The main task of the present chapter is to analyze the concepts “rule,” “rule-governed conduct,” and “guiding conduct by calling attention to a rule.” We will try to show that so far from excluding reason and choice from the practice of political obligation, the fact that these concepts figure in the practice renders reason and choice not only a desirable but a necessary part of it. The most difficult part of this task will be to analyze further what we called the general rule (“Obey the law”) and to show in what respects it is possible to give reasons for accepting or rejecting it. 1
