ABSTRACT
The function of an effective speech for those trained in the classical rhetorical tradition—as most nineteenth-century lawyers were—was to convey truth through sympathy. The truthfulness of a good orator’s words were marked in their ability to move the listener; speeches that failed in this affective function should therefore be given less weight by judges and juries when determining the outcome of trials. Yet (and particularly following seditious revolutionary activity), nineteenth-century commentators were aware that at times speech could overcome good judgement and sway the listener to error. How was the nineteenth-century juryman expected to find truth in speech, if speech was potentially corruptible? Debates on such questions are key to understanding the workings of the early-nineteenth-century Irish court. This chapter explores where and how the courtroom expected to find truth and how their understanding of truth as an emotion shaped courtroom behaviour. Notably, whilst rationality and evidence had key places in this story, no one denied that truth was felt as an emotion, nor argued that the courtroom should be free of emotional judgement. This history reminds us that in certain periods the non-emotional courtroom was not only not evident in social practice but in legal theory.
