ABSTRACT

This chapter focuses on a rather neglected part of president Carter’s foreign policy, that is Eastern Europe. Historiographically, during the Carter years, this region remains in the shadow of US–Soviet relations. In particular, Eastern European policy is usually treated unsystematically and marginally as a derivative of Carter’s human rights offensive towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to sketch Washington’s Eastern European policy by offering an overview of its conceptual foundations and an examination of its application in practice. The Carter White House aimed to refine the criteria of differentiation by introducing domestic liberalization as equally important as external independence vis-à-vis Moscow in accordance to the human rights rhetoric. In reality, however, relations with the Eastern European bloc brought to the surface one of the biggest weaknesses of a universalist policy based on moral ideals such as human rights. Inevitably these clash with strategic priorities and thus the need for exceptions in the name of the national interest paves the way to the criticism of inconsistency and double standards. This inherent contradiction in Carter’s policy undermined its appeal and success and strengthened the argumentation of especially the neoconservative circles in the United States.