ABSTRACT
Materialism may have fitted well with the account of reality given by Newtonian physics but has been superseded by subsequent developments. Roy Bhaskar in the development of his argument for a realist philosophy of science criticised positivism for being ontologically impoverished. While some theoretical misconceptions about the nature of materialism have arisen through the confusion of scientific conceptions being mistaken for ontological descriptions, perhaps a more important objection derives from the question which immediately arises from our second realist proposition. New and sounder basis, a realist epistemology may be defended which is in harmony with both common sense and the actuality of scientific practice. A realist epistemology and ontology are the underlying assumptions of experimental practice and their attempts at explanation. The action of sitting down presumes a belief in the consistency of the reality of the log continuing to exist in the place where it was perceived and a correspondence between our perception and reality.
