ABSTRACT
Under the relational circumstance, major powers differ from small states insofar as they have the option to also act on behalf of the global community, whether in enforcing or undermining specific international rules. We compare the ‘stylistic’ differences between the grand strategies of two major powers—the United States and China—and demonstrates two different types of altercasting in relational politics. The identity-based grand strategy that the United States adopts exerts rule-based altercasting that calls for intervention. In comparison, the relationship-based altercasting that China adopts avoids rules. The grand strategy of a relational actor is to achieve as much acceptance as possible among its peers, as opposed to bringing about a particular world order. This contradicts neoliberal IR thought, especially its proclivity toward interventionism. We use US arms sales to Taiwan as our case and show how China can shelf such a core interest in exchange for a smooth visit by the Chinese President to the States. In short, relational interests prevail over identity interests. We dispute the impression that China has no grand strategy. We propose that Chinese grand strategy is to establish multiple bilateral relationships and avoid involvement in rule enforcing.
