ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the conditions under which and the political objectives for which China might resort to a high-intensity “partial war” with India. It explores the possible Chinese logic of another 1962-style “lesson” to India. Another war with India would not be an appropriate policy choice for Beijing: war with India could entail heavy costs that might endure for a long time. Yet there seem to be circumstances under which acceptance of those heavy, war-related costs would be less onerous and less bad for China than the costs of Chinese non-punishment of Indian moves deemed antithetical to Chinese security and global power ambitions. The clusters of considerations that might persuade Beijing to choose war are: (1) an India–Pakistan war that threatens decisive defeat of Pakistan; (2) successful Indian efforts to thwart China’s efforts to develop security and military ties with South Asian and Indian Ocean states; (3) Indian “anti-China” alignment with the United States, Japan and other countries. Going deep into the red lines between the two nations, the chapter unearths potential areas of conflict and how it might disrupt the entire power struggle in Asia and beyond.
