ABSTRACT
The chapter by Susanne Lütz et al. looks at the troika (now sometimes referred to as the ‘quadriga’ to include the European Stability Mechanism) institutions that were charged with overseeing the conditionality programs of countries that sought official assistance. It notes how the three institutions very often conflicted on the policy conditionalities related to financial stability, fiscal and structural adjustment. By drawing on the programs for Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus, the authors demonstrate different roles and approaches of the Troika institutions toward credit lending. The IMF played the role of an ‘Accountant’, seeking to ensure timely repayment of the loans. The EC acted as a ‘Europeanist’ by interpreting the compatibility of conditionalities with European rules and treaties as a way to regain competitiveness, whereas the ECB, as ‘Monetary Guardian’, focused on securing the financial and monetary stability of the Eurozone in general. The chapter tries to explain these differences through an analysis of the different bureaucratic cultures of the three organizations and discusses the implications of these ‘organizational pathologies’ for the implementation of the lending programs.
