ABSTRACT
Self-knowledge can be used to refer to knowledge of the self and its nature, which are connected to self-consciousness and a few related issues. The starting point for exploring self-consciousness is the notion of basic self-consciousness. This consists of two specific features: self-consciousness can be said to be grounded in a first-person perspective and must be regarded as a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. These peculiarities are grounded in the possibility of using the term/concept I, which presents a few specific epistemic and semantic features: Essential indexicality and immunity to error thorough misidentification. Kant’s approach to self-consciousness seems to succeed in explaining these features as it does consider the above-mentioned features of the concept I in the terms of transcendentalism in some way. Specifically, Kant introduces two forms of self-consciousness: The inner sense, or empirical apperception, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception, an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness. The doctrine of apperception is not to be confused with an introspective psychological approach: In reality, it is a formal model for the thinking activity itself.
