ABSTRACT
The chapter addresses the strictly semantic issue of the nature of I and of the transcendental designation: Some sort of contiguity between the Kantian approach and the contemporary direct reference theory concerning the semantic device of I and the semantic of natural kind terms has been suggested in the debate. In order to rule out any proximity to the direct reference theory concerning these specific semantic issues, the present chapter focuses on how Kant treats indexicality. With the designation of I, just as with the designation of natural kind terms, any application of the direct reference theory aimed at explaining the Kantian approach to indexicality is rejected. With regard to the way I designates, both a general conceptualist/descriptivist strategy and strict indexical approach are dismissed. Kant sees the I as the nexus established by the copula in the judgment by the representational synthesis of the unity of apperception: The I is given as the analytical form of thought. In a way, not only in the inner sense but also at the heart of transcendental apperception proper, Kant is as Humean as Hume himself.
