ABSTRACT
Philosophical work bearing on values, valuations and value judgments or on other 'distinguishable elements to which the word "value" is applied' is very extensive indeed. R. Downie and E. Telfer stated in an introduction to the philosophy of caring and curing, 'moral' remains 'a very slippery term indeed’. However, a beginning can be made by suggesting that 'moral' in moral principles, moral values, moral consideration, has to do with that which is taken to be overriding. The chapter looks at distinctions drawn between different senses of 'value'. It considers distinctions drawn between different activities, such as holding a value, evaluating, judging. The chapter shows that one crucial distinction drawn or discussed by many writers, namely that between 'is' statements and 'value' statements. The most clear and useful distinctions between ways in which the term 'value' is commonly used have been drawn by Charles Morris, to whom reference has already been made.
