ABSTRACT
In Law's Empire Ronald Dworkin's legal theory takes new directions with the introduction of his interpretive theory of law. In Law's Empire Dworkin raises the subject again in order to introduce and explain his development of an interpretive theory of law. Dworkin's move from an analytic to an interpretive theory of law represents a change in his methodology, but many of his former arguments have survived this and remain intact, if in a different form. Philip Soper has said that Dworkin's sting is harmless. The complex nature of legal disagreement, which Neil MacCormick sought to utilise in his critique of Dworkin's theory of discretion, instead serves to undermine the plain fact view of law with its emphasis on clarity and simplicity. Whereas MacCormick's distinction was seen to break down under K. Haakonssen's analysis this does not occur because Dworkin remains at the level of subjectivity and thus does not seek to draw objective conclusions from his distinction between subjective disagreements.
