ABSTRACT
Ronald Dworkin's regards integrity as a normatively superior conception to conventionalism and pragmatism because for him it is only by linking legal argument with the idea of genuine political community that law can be said to have a proper moral content. Dworkin, with Jospeh Raz, wishes to pursue a continuity theory of the foundations of liberalism. Dworkin distinguishes the problem of the legitimacy of coercive power from that of whether citizens have genuine moral obligations arising from the law. Dworkin's argument is then that legal philosopher can be morally affected by being given that which they do not ask for or choose, where this arises as the result of an obligation of role. Dworkin contends that philosopher must insist that the ethical environment be treated in the same way and allowed to be the product of the choices individuals make. Dworkin argues that only a model of community based on integrity can satisfy the conditions he gives for true community.
