ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the debate between Larry Laudan and John Worrall in an attempt to determine whether normative naturalism is able to meet the challenge of relativism which Worrall raises against Laudan's model. It presents Laudan's model of rationality and reviews his debate with Worrall and outlines normative naturalism. The chapter argues that normative naturalism meets the relativist demand for justification of methodological standards, while at the same time avoiding several other forms of relativism. It shows how a form of epistemic relativism involving a justificatory regress returns to haunt normative naturalism, as Worrall suggests. The chapter explains Laudan's likely reply to challenge. It explores the relevant features of the model which Laudan proposes in Science and Values. The chapter outlines of the metamethodological view, and considers whether the view successfully meets the relativist challenge. It suggests that normative naturalism meets the relativist challenge in the sense that it provides an account of the rational justification of methodological standards.
