Introduction

This chapter looks at the question of ancient 'scepticism'. It is widely believed that the scepticism of the early modern era is a development of ancient scepticism, perhaps a radicalization of ancient scepticism, so that hyperbolic doubt—such as doubt about the existence of the external world—comes to be added to the sceptical repertoire. The chapter argues that while Giambattista Vico is able to offer something that is far more fruitful than the Cartesian account of the foundations of knowledge that he is arguing against, in the end it turns out not to offer a special form of understanding at all. Ancient sceptical arguments are not designed to establish that there is an undiscoverable truth of the matter, but that everything is relative. The chapter examines how one might move from Friedrich Nietzsche's account of drama to a more general account of ancient thought, and suggests that the move is actually not as difficult as it might seem.