ABSTRACT
Systematic doubt in the modern that is post-Cartesian, era takes the form of scepticism. This chapter shows that in antiquity it took the form of something more akin to relativism. It looks at several Modes of Aenesidemus, which form the backbone of the revival of Pyrrhonism in first century B.C., a revival that culminated in the work of Sextus Empiricus. The chapter explains exactly what kind of relativism is involved and what form relativistic doubt takes. It argues that scepticism drives epistemological doubt, whereas relativism drives doxastic doubt, and that doubt in antiquity is directed towards beliefs rather than knowledge. The most detailed available account of several Modes of Aenesidemus is that provided by Annas and Barnes in their translation and commentary on the Modes. What the traditional reading of Pyrrhonism as a form of scepticism misses is the fact that ancient relativism is a form of doubt, indeed a form of systematic doubt in the context of the Modes.
