ABSTRACT
Mengzi is one of the most prominent and influential philosophers in East Asia, and in terms of relative impact both on philosophical traditions and on public life, he has been one of the most influential philosophers in history. His theories of moral psychology and moral development are especially well-suited to provide useful insights on eliciting and facilitating changes of perspectives for moral progress. This chapter focuses on anti-realist constructivist accounts of moral progress. It draws three lessons from Mengzi on the meta-ethics of moral progress. The first general lesson was that it is possible to develop an account of moral progress not only in terms of improving moral beliefs but also in terms of improving moral perspectives. The second and third lessons provided Mengzian-inspired tools for developing such an account. The chapter suggests new avenues for constructivist interpretations of the early Confucians and especially for Mengzi, who is likely the major early Confucian philosopher least readily interpreted as constructivist.
