ABSTRACT
This chapter examines sections 2–4 of the Dissertation on the Passions. These central sections contain Hume’s mature account of the indirect passions, notably pride, humility, love, and hatred. These are accounted for by his theory of the double relation of impressions and ideas (or of sentiments and ideas). It is argued that Hume’s earlier account, given in the Treatise, is not as crudely non-cognitivist as has sometimes been supposed, and in particular that Hume never denied that the passions have intentional objects. Furthermore, while in the Treatise the intentionality of the passions is a derivative, extrinsic matter, it is argued that Hume’s later writing suggests an account according to which the passions are intrinsically and essentially intentional. This move towards a more cognitivist view appears to solve a hitherto unnoticed problem with Hume’s earlier presentation of the theory of the double relation.
