Introduction

This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book argues that on the relational approach, logic is infected with psychology, and the ground of truth of a judgment ends up being external to its content. It examines Hegel’s accounts of tensed and moral judgments. The book offers fascinating insights into Hegel’s conception of human self-consciousness. It also argues that Brentano advocated an appealing ‘correctness first’ view. The general notion of the correctness of an action is explanatorily prior to the specific notion of truth in connection with the mental act of judgment on this view: something is good if and only if it is correct to love it. The book assesses Kazimierz Twardowski’s account of judgment. Twardowski maintained that judgments involve only a single idea and are existential in form, and he distinguished the content of an idea from its object.