ABSTRACT
Consider cases in which a thinker rationally makes a logical inference using a primitive principle that she knows to be valid and does so because she knows, on the basis of her understanding, that the principle is valid. These cases raise several puzzles, prime amongst them the puzzle of how there can be a model of rationality that is not purely inferential. I offer a solution to the puzzles that makes use of understanding-based intellectual seemings. These seemings are not perceptual, and the kind of justification they provide diverges sharply from perceptual models. There is also a new transcendental argument for the necessary presence of intellectual seemings in an account of concept possession in general. Applied to the case of logical knowledge, the account can explain their status as a priori. Interweaved into the discussion is consideration of some of the views of Burge, Carnap, Chudnoff, Dummett, and Frege.
