ABSTRACT
The Cartesian first-person point of view regarding the certainty of our judgments seems to imply a form of subjectivism. Locke’s solution to this problem is to widen the scope to a third-person point of view on the notion of judgment, thereby shaping the modern notion of belief. As a result, the distinction between the normative notion of judgment and the empirical notion of belief is no longer distinguished, and epistemology and philosophy in general are threatened by a form of psychologism. Leibniz’s solution to Cartesian subjectivism is to strengthen the idea of first-person knowing. For Leibniz, the first-person point of view is essentially a logical point of view, and the act of judgment plays a crucial role in logic. As the act of judgment is not confused with the empirical notion of belief, and asserted and unasserted propositions are clearly distinguished, there is no threat of psychologism in Leibniz’s logic.x
