ABSTRACT
In 1894, Kazimierz Twardowski published a decisive contribution to post-Brentanian intentionality theory with his Vienna Habilitationsschrift on the content and object of ideas. Less well known and documented is his extension of this distinction to the realm of judgments, which Twardowski mentions only in passing in his treatise but treats at somewhat greater length in lectures on logic from the same period. While Twardowski rejects Brentano’s idiogenic theory that judging consists fundamentally in the acceptance or rejection of objects, his modifications to Brentano are modest, and he retains a role for psychology in the foundations of logic. Tellingly, unlike those of his students who went on to become logicians, he retains the term ‘judgment’ (sąd) rather than ‘sentence’ (zdanie) for the truth-bearers with which logic deals. In one regard, however, he is inflexible: judgments are primary bearers of truth and falsehood, and these are absolute. In this paper, we outline and evaluate Twardowski’s contribution to the theory of judgment.
