ABSTRACT
The initial reaction to devaluation in Labour ranks at Westminster seems to have ranged from scepticism, through numbed confusion, to relief and even escapist euphoria. But it quickly became apparent that devaluation as a fact rather than as a prospect would swiftly put an end to the ‘unholy alliance’ between right and left that had formed after 1966 to promote it at Westminster. Opting for devaluation rather than a massive loan to shore up the old parity meant that the UK could escape the most precise of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions. An opportunity to discuss the situation was provided, ironically enough, by a procedural innovation recently brought in by the Labour Cabinet as a sop to its backbenchers. Michael Foot began the debate not just by listing the explict measures outlined in the Letter but also by emphasising its agreement to consider other unspecified measures that the IMF might recommend.
