ABSTRACT
Taiwan’s defence planning is based on the assumption that Beijing has no intention of relinquishing the option of a military solution of the Taiwan issue, although in 1979 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the phrase of ‘liberation of Taiwan’ with ‘reunification of China.’ In the event of a naval blockade, most of Taiwan’s harbours directly facing the Taiwan Strait would be seriously interdicted. In 1991, a group of Taiwan’s scholars published a draft treaty aimed at alleviating the crisis across the Taiwan Strait. Counter-landing warfare is the primary task for the Republic of China (ROC) army in the event of a PRC amphibious invasion. Taiwan has begun to transform its defence-oriented national security policy by balancing the dimensions of diplomacy, defence, trade, and cross-strait relations. Facing increasing Legislative Yuan oversight in defence matters, the ROC’s Ministry of National Defence committed itself to reduce personnel and raise efficiency in order to win support for the new defence budget.
