ABSTRACT
1 – Sergio – Jean-François Lyotard defines the concept of differend in his book The Differend: Phrases in Dispute as follows: “as distinguished from a litigation, a differend [différend in French] would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments” ( Lyotard 1988 : xi). A litigation in Lyotard’s universe can always be resolved because both parties implicitly acknowledge each other’s claims to be legitimate. In this sense, the “damage” of a litigation can be quantified and compensated since both parties share and agree on the same judging criteria. As such, the philosophical form that best illustrates the presupposition of mutual recognition at work in a litigation is “dialogue”. A “wrong”, which structures a differend, is produced when the plaintiff does not own one or more genres of discourse which would enable the wrong she suffered to be established. Or again, there is a wrong every time a plaintiff has to prove in court the injustice she suffered by only using the genre of discourse of her perpetrators.
