ABSTRACT
Wireless networks are susceptible to interference from outside, which is a serious problem for WNCSs. To analyze jamming attacks on WNCSs, game theory that acts as a powerful tool has been employed to model interactions between legitimate users and malicious jammers [22]. Stochastic game framework for anti-jamming defense design is proposed with time-varying spectrum environment in a cognitive radio network [135]. In [117], a Bayesian jamming game between a legitimate transmitter and a smart jammer is discussed when there exists incomplete information for every network user. The Stackelberg game is a well-developed and appropriate method to cope with hierarchical interactions among players in the anti-jamming field [155]. Furthermore, an anti-jamming Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information is proposed in [66]. In the cyber layer of a WNCS, the interaction between a malicious jammer and a legitimate user is reasonable to take as a Bayesian Stackelberg game in incomplete information environment. As mentioned in [171, 170, 173], resilient control strategies that focus on maintaining the operational normalcy expand the scope of classical control methods. Then to make NCSs achieve optimal performances, H∞ minimax theory is employed while a plant controller is designed under the worst case [16].
