ABSTRACT
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book examines L. Molina’s conceptions of freedom, laying particular emphasis on his conception of contingency as pure indifference or perfect equipoise. It explores G. W. Leibniz’s conception of freedom, and discusses spontaneity and rationality. The book describes Leibniz’s account of contingency both in terms of the pure possibles and in terms of the infinite. It demonstrates adequacy of the former and the inadequacy of the latter, despite Leibniz’s claim that considerations of the infinite succeed in distinguishing necessity from contingency. The book outlines Leibniz’s views on freedom and divine foreknowledge, highlighting his indebtedness to Molina and his ingenuity in resolving a difficulty confronting Molina’s doctrine of Scientia media. It shows that, despite the difficulties Leibniz’s conception of freedom raises for his metaphysics, his solution of the problem of freedom and necessity is in many respects superior to those of Aquinas and Molina.
