ABSTRACT
G. W. Leibniz rejects Louis Molina’s conception of contingency as pure indifference. Leibniz’s refutation of the Molinistic sense of indifference is done on both a posteriori and a priori, to be precise, logical grounds. For Leibniz, to advocate pure indifference, as Molina did, is to exalt the notion of chance. And in denying that there are chance events in Nature, Leibniz shows that the conception of contingency as pure indifference is untenable. As regards the principle of sufficient reason itself, Leibniz sees it as, in a way, a restatement of T. Hobbes’ doctrine, that for every event there exists a concatenation of causes the absence of one of which results in the nonoccurrence of the event. Leibniz attaches so much importance to Theodicy principle not only because it applies to both necessary and contingent events, but also because it can never be disproved. Leibniz also rejects freedom as absolute indifference by invoking his principle of the identity of indiscernibles.
