ABSTRACT
G. W. Leibniz’s philosophy has been subject to varying interpretations. Some philosophers, for instance L. Russell and L. Couturat, have rendered a rationalistic account of Leibniz, arguing that the whole of his philosophy is derived from his logic. ‘In Leibniz’s philosophy’, he remarks, ‘everything, from the law of Sufficient Reason onwards, depends, through the introduction of final causes, upon Ethics’. In On True Method in Philosophy and Theology Leibniz emphasizes this point: Many think that mathematical rigour has no place outside of the sciences ordinarily called mathematical. Leibniz indeed attached much importance to strict formalism in his works. Couturat’s reading of Leibniz clearly confirms Leibniz’s indebtedness to Thomas Aquinas. Leibniz’s conception of freedom is regarded by many philosophers as inconsistent with his metaphysics in general. Couturat’s interpretation is also wrong not so much in his claim that the principle of sufficient reason affirms the doctrine of truth as in his interpretation of the word ‘analytic’.
