ABSTRACT
Chapter 4 argues that Foucault, through Belgian Surrealist René Magritte, introduces an account of thought as thing, and that he uses a negative figure of thought when forming his argument. Foucault’s analysis of Magritte, the author suggests, was influenced by his reading of Gilles Deleuze. The influence is detectable in the differences between the first and the second version of his Magritte essay, and the influence from Deleuze is here used to describe Foucault’s account of thinking in series rather than in original versus copy-relations. Foucault’s reasoning on Magritte is subsequently put in relation to the critique of the apophatic in John Caputo and to Catherine Keller’s notion of entanglement. Finally, the author suggests that Keller’s entangled knowing-together comes closer to the Foucauldian account than does Caputo’s apophatic not-knowing.
