ABSTRACT
Surely possessive individualists do not have to be Rothbardian libertarians. This chapter aims to lay out Nozick’s invisible hand argument for the development of the state, review the extent to which the invisible hand argument is equivocal then take up an historical idea touched on by Rothbard, as a counter-example to Nozick. The juxtaposition of Nozick’s minimal state (MS) with tuatha will indicate a conundrum such that if the MS is inescapable it cannot be derived from a “most favourable” anarchic condition but if, on the other hand, the MS is not inescapable then it can be shown that the state of nature is preferable to Nozickian PIs. The requirements of Nozickian PIs, it might be worth reminding ourselves are: recognition of their natural rights, compensation for boundary crossings into them and procedural rights to regulate processes.
