ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at Vinit Haksar's arguments to see whether they work against John Rawls but, more particularly, whether they would also apply to the parties in the position of equal power. It shows that impartialism is preferable to Haksar's perfectionist egalitarianism because it reduces the reliance on intuition unavoidable in his approach. Although impartialism is similar in many respect to I. Kant's ethical outlook, with the decisions of the parties in a position of equal power playing the role within impartialism of the Categorical Imperative, it parts company with him on the treatment of animals, rejecting his claim to the effect that we have no direct duties to animals. Impartialism differentiates between persons and nonpersons without having to import perfectionist assumptions. A plausible case can be made that there are important internal differences between the desires of persons and the desires of nonpersons.
