ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at the linguistics of four different categories of language crimes and other wrongful acts: perjury (lying under oath about something important), a violation against the judicial system; defamation, a violation against a person (and not a crime, but a tort, something that one can be sued for); solicitation of a crime, a violation against society; and conspiracy to commit a crime, another violation against society. Three cases get close attention: U.S. v. Bronston (1973, perjury), People v. Rubin (1979, solicitation), and State v. St. Christopher (1975, conspiracy). Also discussed: New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), the decision establishing a high bar to prove defamation of public officials, and consequently a major First Amendment freedom of the press case; and Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), a landmark freedom of speech case. The linguistic analysis will include developing Coleman & Kay’s 1981 analysis of lying to apply it to perjury, suggesting a set of felicity conditions for the speech act analysis of solicitation, Tiersma’s 1987 speech act treatment of defamation as “public accusation,” and an analysis of the semantics of reciprocal verbs for understanding the legal distinction between “unilateral” and “bilateral” views of conspiracy.
