ABSTRACT
This chapter explores some theoretical problems that surround the thorny issue of economic reform, whether it is in the former socialist states or in ailing capitalist economies. It discusses the overall content of the partial reform package, defining important terms as the privatization of money supply by the keiretsu and the chaebol. The content of chaebol and keiretsu reform involves further neutralizing sources of external hostilities. The chaebol, for instance, wants to utilize this opportunity as a way of demonstrating its will to defy the state’s guidance in economic matters. A strategic and intentional explanation of the organizational reform in the chaebol and the keiretsu explains what other theories do not intend to explain — structural changes of successful organizations at the time of hostile external threat. Chaebols and keiretsus had pursued the first two strategies even before the financial crisis, indirectly auguring the strenuous position they had been in under the ongoing state-bank network.
