ABSTRACT
This chapter proposes eight theses. First, big business organizations are the result of the state-business interaction. Second, under the mafioso state firms promote growth with diversification instead of specialization. Third, the ownership structure of the diversified business groupings depends on the degree of hostility from the mafioso state in question. Fourth, in a defeated mafioso state, state-business interaction was toward close co-operation between the two in order to fend off hostile foreign intervention in domestic markets. Fifth, in a military-style mafioso state state-business interaction was to limit the number of domestic oligopolies. Sixth, the state-business interaction between the mafioso state and big businesses remained stable. Seventh, civilian political reforms after the fall of the mafioso state necessitated ‘market’ reforms. Eighth, given the size of the chaebol and the keiretsu, these will only strengthen themselves by further diversifying into the financial sector. The chapter also presents some closing thoughts on the key concepts discussed in the preceding chapters of this book.
