ABSTRACT
Alasdair MacIntyre points to the apparently arbitrary nature of rule-following in modern ethics, he is making the casuistical point that the rules that are being stipulated do not have any clear derivation or justification in an overall scheme of casuistry; as a result, they appear irrational and arbitrary injunctions. The first thing to notice about any specific casuistry is that it operates along the lines of an axiomatic-deductive system. In an ideal scheme of casuistry, there stands a supreme principle which operate(s) as the basic axiom (or axioms). MacIntyre’s overall attitude to casuistry is surely clear enough: it is absolutely indispensable for the rationality and coherence of ethics to have a shared casuistical framework. MacIntyre’s overall attitude to casuistry, then, seems to be a cautious defence of it. He holds that, if ethics is to be rational and coherent, a shared casuistical framework is essential, and reference to the axiomatic-deductive nature of casuistry is indispensable.
