ABSTRACT
Reductive metaethical views have ethical implications that are frequently inconsistent with our settled ethical intuitions and favoured ethical theories. This makes theory choice in metaethics difficult. When we are assessing reductive views, what sort of weight should we accord to their counterintuitive ethical implications? How should we weigh intensional adequacy and explanatory power against apparent extensional inadequacy? I argue that we currently assign too much weight to extensional worries in our metaethical theorising: We should be willing to tolerate even a great many counterintuitive ethical implications for the sake of a compelling explanation of our ethical practices. Especially when it comes to theorising about reasons for action, extensional worries should take a back seat to intensional adequacy and explanatory power. My case for this claim begins with a familiar story about the origins of our moral concepts drawn from the work of G. E. M. Anscombe and Alisdair MacIntyre and proceeds via an observation about the nature of practical reasoning.
