ABSTRACT
Moral nativists argue that the hypothesis space for moral rule learning is innately constrained. Hence, moral nativism predicts that some rules (or types of rules) should be hard or impossible to learn. In this chapter, we consider a rule type which (i) lacks any real-world precedent and (ii) is easy to construct by combining elements of common rules. This rule type prohibits allowing a consequence but does not prohibit bringing that consequence about deliberately. Inspired by a quote often attributed to Oscar Wilde, we call such rules Wilde rules. Given the two features noted here, Wilde rules seem to provide a natural opportunity for the moral nativist to posit a developmental constraint. In three studies, we investigate the extent to which there is an innate constraint against Wilde rules. Firstly, we find that participants express a bias against Wilde rules. Secondly, we find that this bias has a modest effect on rule learning given only positive evidence about rule violations. Lastly, however, we find that this effect is no longer significant when evidence draws participants’ attention to the sample space of possible violations. Furthermore, we cite previous findings which suggest that the bias observed in Study 2 could itself be learned by the consistent absence of Wilde rules in ordinary life. Ultimately, we conclude that, while there may be a bias against Wilde rules, there seems to be no hard constraint against learning them.
