ABSTRACT
If inaccessibility to consciousness is sufficient to mark the distinction, then unconscious beliefs would have to be considered as states of tacit knowledge. It is claimed by S. P. Stich that states of tacit knowledge are both inaccessible to consciousness and inferentially isolated from beliefs. The strength of the response rests ultimately on the credentials of a notion of intentionality that is non-derived and yet distinct from that normally associated with beliefs and desires. Although the notion of accessibility to consciousness may well capture what is special about the intentionality of states of belief and the like, it is not clear that all intentional states conform to this requirement. If indicator aboutness could be shown to be parasitic upon attitude 'aboutness' which according to Searle is the only intrinsic aboutness to be had, then this would not be a candidate form of intentionality to serve the purposes of the friend of tacit knowledge.
