ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at two other versions of knowledge first virtue epistemology in the literature. The first, which is due to Alan Millar, combines a knowledge first virtue reliabilist account of knowledge with a knowledge first accessibilist account of justified belief. On Millar’s view a belief is justified only if it qualifies as knowledge. It is argued that, as a result, the view succumbs to a new version of the Gettier problem, which is the problem of explaining the presence of justification in Gettier cases. The second, due to Lisa Miracchi, is weaker in that it allows for justified belief to fall short of knowledge. While Miracchi can thus make progress on the new Gettier problem, it is argued that her view still runs into trouble with a specific kind of Gettier case, to wit fake barn cases. It is shown that my own version of knowledge first virtue reliabilism can avoid the problems on both sides.
