ABSTRACT
Propositions have been treated linguistically as declarative sentences, psychologically as judgments, and logically as that which is true or false. The division of intellectual workers into grammarians, psychologists and logicians has tended to make us treat these supplementary modes of approach as if they were mutually exclusive. The prevailing view has regarded propositions as essentially judgments which are acts of individual minds. Propositions are not mere psychological acts of judgment independent of their linguistic expression or of a world beyond them. It is extremely doubtful whether any of us do really ever make judgments without the use of some linguistic medium. The analysis of propositions into S is P or aRb is often illuminating, but not always fitting. The objective theory of the meaning of propositions has been generally rejected on the ground that it does not fit the nature, of negative judgments, of true assertions about non-existing or logically impossible entities, and of false proportions.
