ABSTRACT
From a socio-legal perspective, this chapter considers the contrasting operation of criminal law in the context of the illegal gambling phenomenon of “jogo do bicho” (animal game) in Brazil. It argues that the conflict between the rationality supporting the criminalization of “jogo do bicho,” and the constitutional framework orienting the operation of the criminal law system in Brazil (particularly the social adequacy theory), supported law enforcement authorities to loosen the enforcement of anti-“jogo do bicho” provisions. The operation of the informal decriminalization created a semi-legal space where uncertainty, corruption, and parallel forms of criminal governance flourished. The chapter initially presents the historical and legal context of “jogo do bicho” in Brazil. It then presents the contrasts between the rationale guiding the criminalization of games of chance in Brazil and the existing framework orienting the application of criminal law in the country. Criminalization of “jogo do bicho” has led to the emergence of shadow industries making regulation and control difficult, and this will be discussed in a section on mafia behavior versus elitist morality. Finally, this chapter analyzes the effects of ambiguous operation in the overall structure of the Brazilian criminal law system.
